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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Assessment of the Pyrotechnics FMEA/CIL
m
m
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
=
_he McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
:June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
ithe Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
_List (CIL). Directio--nwas:given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects.Office to perform the hardware analysis using t ehg_
" instructlons and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. Instruc_£ions--
_or Preparation of FMEA and CIL. i0 October 1986. ---
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Pyrotechnics
(PYRO) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential
critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was
accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within
the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then
compared to the NASA _A/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L
updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the
comparison is provided thr0ugh additional analysis as required.
This report documents the=resul£sOf £hat comparison for the
Orbiter Pyrotechnics hardware.
i
The IOA product for the Pyrotechnics analysis consisted of forty-
one -(41) failure mode "worksheets" that resulted for_y-one (41)
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) being identified. Comparison was
made to the NASA baseline (as of 19 November 1986) which
_ consisted of £hirty-seven (37)_:_As and thirty-seven (37) CIL
items. The comparison determined if there were any results which
_ had been found by the IOA that were not in the NASA baseline.
This comparison produced agreement on all but seven (7) FMEAs
which caused differences'in fo_r-(4) CIL items. Three (3) of the
differences were caused by-incorrect criticality assignments on
-: .....the IOA FMEAs where the IOA _a_alysis numerical values were not in
agreement with the "EffeG_s" verbiage. IOA acknowledges the
error and agrees with the NASA criticality assignment to the
failure and these items are not issde$. The CIL was not in
question as IOA had considered all to be CIL items. The IOA
analysis includes four (4) failure modes" (CIL items) which were
not included in the NASA FMEAs or CIL. Figure 1 presents a
comparison of £he proposed Post 51-L NASA b_seline, with the IOA
b "recommende_ aseline, and any issues. "\
i \
Some of the miscompares arose due to differences "b_tween the NASA
and I oA FMEA/CIL preparation instructions. NASA had. used an
older ground rules document which has since been superseded by
th4 N$TS 22206 used by the IOA. After comparison, ther@ were no
other discrepancies found that were not already identified by
NASA, and the remaining issues may be attributed to differences
in ground rules.
1 ORIG AL
OF POOR JALrrY
• II II
PYROTECHNICS ASSESSMENT SUMMARY
IOA NASA ISS U ES
FMEA 41 37 4
CIL 41 37 4
...... IIII
i
I
I
I
P/L RETN/DEPLO_'
! IOA NASA ISSUES I I IOA NASA ISSUES
I FMEA 6 6 0 I I FMEA 6 6 0
! c,L _ _ o I i c,L _ _ ..o
I IOANASAISSUESi
IFMEA 8 4 4 I
CIL 8 4 4
Figure 1 - PYROTECHNICS FMEA/CIL ASSESSMENT
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS office has
undertaken the task of re-evaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the proposed Post 51-L Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and
technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 kualysls Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the proposed Post 51-L NASA and Prime
Contractor FMEA/CIL. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL which is
documented in this report.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
I.I Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
i
3
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
I
i
2.4 Ground Rules and Assumptions
The ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined in
Appendix B. The Pyrotechnic specific ground rules and
assumptions are defined in paragraph B.3 of Appendix B.
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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3. I Design and Function
Space Shuttle Orbiter Pyrotechnics are defined as the devices and
assemblies operated by solid propellants or explosive devices.
The Pyrotechnics addressed in this study are those that are used
in the following applications. The Pyrotechnics used as the
primary method for separation of the External Tank from the
Orbiter. The Pyrotechnics used for assist and backupdevices for
Landing Gear deployment. The Pyrotechnics employed as emergency
devices to guillotine and jettison the Remote Manipulator Arm,
guillotine and release the Rendezvous Radar (RR) Antenna, and
separate the outer window and open the inner window for ground
emergency egress.
i. Landing/Deceleration Systems Pyr0£echnics are employed in
the Nose Landing Gear (NLG) Uplock Release, Main Landing
Gear (MLG) Uplock Release, and the NLG Extension Thruster.
Pyrotechnic up!ock thrusters serve as backup to the
Hydraulic Deployment System for the NLG and the MLG prior
to landing and are used only if the primary hydraulic
system fails. The pyrotechnic NLG Extension thruster is
used to provide mechanical assist to initiate nose gear
and nose gear door movement against opposing air loads
and are fired every flight whether needed or not.
2. Orbiter/External Tank (ET) Separation Mechanisms
employ pyrotechnic devices as the primary method to
separate the ET from the Orbiter at one forward (fwd) and
two aft attach points and to disconnect the Liquid
Hydrogen (LH2) and the Liquid Oxygen (LO2) umbilical
plates. The fwd structural attach point is separated by
fracture of a single Fwd Attach Shear Bolt. The aft
structural attach points are separated by fracture of
their respective Aft Attach Frangible Nut. The umbilical
plates are separated by fracturing six frangible nuts.
3. Rendezvous Radar (RR) Antenna Emergency Release
Pyrotechnics are provided to release the structural
attachment and sever the cable in the event the normal
RR Antenna stowage mechanism fails and RRAntenna
is necessary to permit payload bay door closure.
4. Payload Retention and Deploy Jettison Pyrotechnics are
_i_ used to guillotine the cables and jettison the the
remote_manipUiator-ai_m and arm SUpport bracket in the
event the normal retraction stowage mechanism fails and
the arm interferes with payload bay door closure for
safe deorbit.
5
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3.1 Design and Function (cont'd)
5. Crew Station and Equipment Ground Emergency Egress
Pyrotechnics are employed to break the attach bolts to
the sever the outer window and to open the inner
window. Window severance can be initiated from either
the interior of the crew compartment or the exterior
right hand side for ground crew use. The system would
only be utilized if a failure occurs that requires crew
egress and the entry door is jammed.
mE
mE
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Interfaces and Locations
The Landing/Deceleration Pyrotechnics interface with the
Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD&C) SubSystem
at the Nasa Standard Initiators (NSIs) via the Pyro
Initiator Controllers (PICs) to initiate operation of the
pyrotechnic devices. The pyrotechnics interface
mechanically with the NLG and MLG Up!ock Re!ease Mechanisms
to provide backup to the Hydraulic Deployment System and to
provide assist to the NLG to initiate Nose Gear/Door
movement against opposing air loads.
The Orbiter/ET Separation Pyrotechnics interface with the
Electrical Power Distributi0nand-Control _EPD&C) Subsystem
at the NasaStandard Ini£iators (NSIs) via the Pyro
Initiator Controllers (PICs) to initiate operation of the
pyrotechnic devices to effect Orbiter/ET separation upon
command. The pyrotechnics interface at one fwd and two aft
attach points that structurally attach the elements and also
at the LO2 and LH2 umbilical plates.
The RMS Guillotine and Jettison Pyrotechnics interface with
the Electrical Power Distribution and control (EPD&C)
Subsystem at the Nasa Standard Initiators (NSIs) via the
Pyro Initiator Controllers (PICs) to initiate operation of
the pyrotechnic devices to sever the electrical cable and
release the manipulator arm and arm support bracket if
required. The pyrotechnics interface physicallylwith the
RMS at the base and at the three Manipulator Positioning
Mechanisms (MPMs).
The RRGuillotine and Release Pyrotechnics interface with
the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD&C)
Subsystem at the Nasa Standard Initiators (NSIs) via the
Pyro Initiator Controllers (PICs) to initiate operation of
the pyrotechnic devices to sever the eiec£riCai cable and
effect non-propulsive emergency release of the RR Antenna.
The pyrotechnics interface mechanically with the RR Antenna
at the antenna structural attach point.
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5.
Xnterfaoes and Locations (cont'd)
The Crew Station and Equipment Pyrotechnics interface with a
T-handle in the crew compartment and another on the exterior
right hand side, either of which can be used to fire a
mechanical initiator to blow away the outer panel and open
the inner window panel for emergency crew egress. A stowed
prybar is provided to force open the inner window if
required.
u
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illustrates the hierarchy of the Pyrotechnics hardware
and the corresponding subcomponents. Figures 3 through 9
comprise the detailed system representation.
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4.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the Pyrotechnics hardware initially generated
forty-one (41) failure mode worksheets and identified forty-one
(41) Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the
assessment process. No additional failure mode analysis
worksheets were generated to facilitate comparison. These
analysis results were compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L
baseline of thirty-seven (37) FMEAs and thirty-seven (37) CIL
items, which were generated using the NSTS-22206 FMEA/CIL
instructions. Upon completion of the assessment, twenty-seven
(27) of the thirty-seven (37) FMEAs were in agreement. Of the
thirteen (13) that remained, seven (7) had minor discrepancies
that did not affect criticality. Of the remaining six (6), three
(3) were the result of data entry errors and involve the
numerical criticality assignment. IOA recommends upgrading the
criticalities of two (2) IOA FMEAs from 2/IR to i/I and
downgrading the criticality of one IOA FMEA from i/I to 2/IR.
There are four (4) IOA FMEAs for two (2) components not analyzed
by the NASA FMEAs. In summary, IOA recommends that the credible
failure modes of "Fail to Function" and "Inadvertent Operation"
be included for the respective pressure cartridges in the RMS
Guillotine Assembly and the Rendezvous Radar Release Mechanism.
A summary of the quantity Of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table I.
Table I Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment
Component I NASA
Landing/Decel
Orbiter/ET Sep
Rend Radar Rel
P/L Retn/Depl
Crew Sta & Eqp
TOTAL
9
12
4
6
6
37
IOA
9
12
8
6
6
41
Issues
0
0
4
0
0
4
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A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table II.
I
+
I
+
Table II Summary Of
Component
Landing/Decel
Orbiter/ET Sep
Rend Radar Rel
P/L Retn/Depl
Crew Sta & Eqp
I TOTAL
+
NASA
9
4
6
6
37
[OA CIL Assessment
IOA
9
12
8
6
6
41
Issues
0
0
4
0
0
4
Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure mode identified and assessed. Appendix D highlights the
NASA Critical Items and corresponding IOA worksheet ID. Appendix
E contains IOA analysis worksheets supplementing previous
analysis results reported in Space Transportation System
Engineering and Operations Support (STSEOS) Working Paper No.
1.0-WP-VA86005-OI, Analysis of the Pyrotechnics Subsystem, 19
January, 1988. Appendix F provides a cross reference between the
NASA FMEA and corresponding IOA worksheet(s). IOA
recommendations are also summarized.
Table III presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the Post 51-L FMEA baseline. Further
discussion of each of these subdivisions and the applicable
failure modes is provided in subsequent paragraphs.
w
w
L_
L_
l TABLE III Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities I
...... _
Criticality".
Landing/Decel
Orbiter/ET Sep
RRAnt Rel
P/L Retn/Depl
Crew Sta & Eq
1/i
8
9
4
5
2
28l TOTAL
4
2/IR
1
3
2
0
4
10
2/2
0
0
2
1
0
3 I
17
3/IR
0
0
0
0
0
3/2R
0
0
0
0
0
3/3
0
0
0
0
0
TOTAL
9
12
.8
6
6
41
Of the failure modes analyzed, forty-one (41) were determined to
be critical items. A summary of the IOA recommended critical
items is presented in Table IV.
ira.
I
I Summary of IOA Recommended Critical Items i
4......
TABLE IV
._m_EEwm_mo_
Criticality:
Landing/Decel
Orbiter/ET Sep
RRAnt Rel
P/L Retn/Depl
Crew Sta & Eq
+
I TOTAL
÷
i/I
8
9
4
5
2
28 I
2/IR
1
3
2
0
4
i0
2/2
0
0
2
1
0
..... +
31
3/IR
0
0
0
0
0
0
3/2R
0
0
0
0
0
3/3
0
0
0
0
0
0
TOTAL
9
12
8
6
6
41
I
i
mB
W
l
mm
I
I
I
z ill i _
J
mS
mm
l
._ r
I
18 z
l
I
mm
The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis
(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table V.
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] Table V IOA Worksheet Numbers ]
I Pyrotechnic Systems and Components ID Number [
4 +
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MLG Uplock Release Thruster Assy
MLG Uplock ReleaseThruster Pressure Cartridge
MLG Uplock Release Thruster Pressure Cartridge
NWG Uplock Release Thruster Assy
NWG Uplock Release Thruster Pressure Cartridge
NWG Uplock Release Thruster Pressure Cartridge
NWG Extension Assist Thruster Assy
NWG Exten Assist Thrust Assy Pressure Cartridge
NWG Exten Assist Thrust Assy Pressure Cartridge
ORBITER/ET SEPARATION MECHANISMS
Forward Separation Shear Bolt
Forward Separation Shear Bolt
Fwd Sep Shear Bolt Pressure Cartridge
Fwd Sep Shear Bolt Pressure Cartridge
Aft Separation Frangible Nut (i Left/l Right)
Aft Separation Frangible Nut (I Left/l Right)
Aft Sep Frangible Nut Detonator Booster (2/Nut)
Aft Sep Frangible Nut Detonator Booster (2/Nut)
Umbilical Plate Sep Frangible Nut (3/Plate)
Umbilical Plate Sep Frangible Nut (3/Plate)
Umbil Plate Sep Frangible Nut Detonator (2/Nut)
Umbil Plate Sep Frangible Nut Detonator (2/Nut)
4601
4602
4603
4604
4605
4606
4607
4608
4609
4651
4652
4653
4654
4655
4656
4657
4658
4661
4662
4663
4664
w
RENDEZVOUS RADAR ANTENNA EMERGENCY RELEASE
Guillotine Assy
Guillotine Assy
Guillotine Assy Pressure Cartridge
Guillotine Assy Pressure Cartridge
Release Nut
Release Nut
Release Nut Pressure Cartridge
Release Nut Pressure Cartridge
4701
4702
4703
4704
4705
4706
4707
4708
L
i
19
I Table V IOA Worksheet Numbers (Cont'd)
+ ÷
Pyrotechnic Systems and Components
PAYLOAD RETENTION AND DEPLOY RNS RNt._.ASE
Manipulator Positioning Mechanism Retractor
Manipulator Positioning Mechanism Retractor
Shoulder Umbilical Guillotine Assy Type I
Shoulder Umbilical Guillotine Assy Type I
Pedestal UmbilicalGuillotine Assy Type II
Pedestal Umbilical Guillotine Assy Type II
CREW STATION AND EQUIPMENT
Outer Window Assy
Inner Window Assy
Energy Transfer System
Initiator Assy Pyro
0.3-Sec Time Delay Cartridge Assy
Thru Bulkhead Initiator
I
ID Number I
4751
4752
4753
4754
4755
4756
4801
4802
4803
4804
4805
4806
4.1 Assessment Results - Landing/Deceleration System
Pyrotechnics
The IOA analysis of the Landing/Deceleration System Pyrotechnics
generated nine (9) failure mode worksheets and identified nine
(9) Potential Critical Items before starting the assessment
process. Of the nine (9) IOA FMEAs, seven (7) were Criticality
I/I and two were Criticality 2/IR. The NASA analysis consisted
of nine (9) FMEAs and nine (9) CIL items. Of the nine (9), eight
(8) were Criticality i/I and one (i) was Criticality 2/IR.
After re-evaluating the component involved and the function it
performs in comparison to the NASA Post 51L FMEA/CILs, IOA
recommends the IOA FMEAs be changed to agree with the NASA FMEAs
and CIL items. There are no issues to be resolved for the
Landing/Deceleration System Pyrotechnics.
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4.2 Assessment Results - Orbiter/ET Separation Mechanisms
Pyrotechnics
The IOA analysis of the Orbiter/ET Separation Mechanisms
Pyrotechnics generated twelve (12) failure mode worksheets and
identified twelve (12) Potential Critical Items before starting
the assessment process. Of the twelve (12) IOA FMEAs, nine (9)
were Criticality i/i and three (3) were Criticality 2/IR and all
are considered PCIs. The NASA analysis consisted of twelve (12)
FMEAs and twelve (12) CIL items. Of the twelve (12), nine (9)
were Criticality I/i and three (3) were Criticality 2/IR. There
are no issues to be resolved for the Orbiter/ET Separation
Mechanisms Pyrotechnics.
4.3 Assessment Results - Rendezvous Radar (RR) Antenna Release
Pyrotechnics
The IOA analysis of the RR Antenna Release Pyrotechnics generated
eight (8) failure mode worksheets and identified eight (8)
Potential Critical Items before starting the assessment process.
Of the eight (8) IOA FMEAs, four (4) were Criticality I/I, two
(2) were Criticality 2/IR and two (2) were Criticality 2/2. The
NASA baseline consists of four (4) FMEAs and four (4) CIL items.
The four (4) NASA FMEAs and four (4) of the IOA FMEAs are in
agreement. However, there are four (4) IOA FMEAs which were
generated for two (2) RR Antenna Release Pyrotechnics components
that were not included in the NASA baseline. The two (2)
components involved are the dual Pressure Cartridges for the
Guillotine Assembly and also the dual Pressure Cartridges for the
Release Nut. The failure modes identified by IOA are "Fail to
Function" and "Inadvertent Operation" which results in four
FMEAs, all of which are considered to be Potential Critical
Items. IOA recommends that the NASA consider these failure modes
for inclusion in the CIL for the RR Antenna Release Pyrotechnics.
These issues have not been resolved.
m
4.4 Assessment Results - Payload Retention/Deploy Guillotine
and Jettison Pyrotechnics
The IOA analysis of the Payload Retention/Deploy Guillotine and
Jettison Pyrotechnics generated six (6) failure mode worksheets
and identified six (6) Potential Critical Items before starting
the assessment process. Of the six (6) IOA FMEAs, five (5) were
Criticality i/i and one (i) was Criticality 2/2. The are
considered PCIs. The NASA analysis consisted of six (6) FMEAs
and six (6) CIL items. Of the six (6), five (5) were
Criticality i/i and one (I) was Criticality 2/2. There are no
issues to be resolved for the Payload Retention/Deploy Guillotine
and Jettison Pyrotechnics.
21
4.5 Assessment Results - Crew Station and Equipment Ground
Emergency Egress Pyrotechnics
The IOA analysis of the Crew Station and Equipment Ground
Emergency Egress Pyrotechnics generated six (6) failure mode
worksheets and identified six (6) Potential Critical Items before
starting the assessment process. Of the six (6) IOA FMEAs, two
(2) were Criticality i/l and four (4) were Criticality 2/IR.
There are no issues to be resolved for the Crew Station and
Equipment Emergency Egress Pyrotechnics.
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documentation used in the analysis includes the following:
I. NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of Failure
_<_i_Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL), Oct I0, 1986
•
•
•
JSC-08934, Shuttle Operational Data Book, Systems
Performanceand Constraints Data, Rev D, Oct 1984
JSC-II174, Space Shuttle Systems Handbook, Rev C,
DCN-5, Sep 13, 1985
MCI14-0018, Rockwell Procurement Specification, Nut,
Frangible, Rev C-05, Mar 20, 1980
MC325-0004, Rockwell Procurement Specification, Energy
Transfer System, Pyrotechnic, Crew Escape, Rev D-13,
Jun 13, 1982
o MC325-0005, Rockwell Procurement Specification,
Initiator Assembly, Pyrotechnic, Panel Jettison, Energy
Transfer System, Rev B-07, Mar 12, 1982
7. MC325-0006, Rockwell Procurement Specification, Thruster
Assembly, Pyrotechnic, Emergency Nose Gear Uplock
Release, Rev B-01, Jan 2, 1977
8. MC325-0007, Rockwell Procurement Specification, Pressure
Cartridge, Electrically Initiated, Oct 30, 1974
• MC325-0014, Rockwell Procurement Specification,
Separation Bolt, Pyrotechnic, Mechanically Redundant,
Rev D-02, Jul 29, 1983
i0. MC325-0017, Rockwell Procurement Specification, Booster
Cartridge Assembly, Frangible Device, Rev A-04, Oct 31,
1978
Ii. MC325-0018, Rockwell Procurement Specification, Nut,
Frangible, Rev C-05, Mar 20, 1980
w
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12.
13.
MC325-0019, Rockwell Procurement Specification,
Thruster Assembly, Main Landing Gear Uplock Release,
Aug 3, 1976
MC325-0021, Rockwell Procurement Specification,
Manipulator Arm Release, Rev A-04, Jan 3, 1979
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14. MC325-0022, Rockwell Procurement Specification,
Guillotine Assembly, Pyrotechnic, Remote Manipulator
System Umbilical Separation, Rev A-04, Jan 18, 1982
15. MC325-0024, Rockwell Procurement Specification,
Guillotine Assembly, Pyrotechnic, Ku-Band Radar/
Communications Umbilical Separation, Rev A-03, Feb 22,
1979
16. MC325-0025, Rockweil Procurement Specification, Release
Nut, Segmented, Rendezvous Radar/Ku-Band Communication
Antenna Retention and Separation, Rev A-03, Feb 22,
1980 7_'_:_i__!:_ _ _:: _
17. MC353-0021, Rockwell Procurement Specification,
Cartridge Assembly, Detonator, Hotwire, Electrically
Initiated, Rev S-02, Sep 9, 1977
18. VO70-510550, Rockwell Drawing, Uplock Assembly - Nose
Landing Gear, Rev B-10, Nov 7, 1985
20.
19. VO70-552001, Rockwell Drawing, Cartridge Installation -
Nose Landing Gear Thruster, Rev B-06, Nov 8, 1982
VO70-552002, Rockwell Drawing, Thruster, Nose Landing
Gear Emergency Uplock Release, Rev A-05, Nov 17, 1980
21. VO70-553301, Rockwell Drawing, Energy Transfer system
Installation - Emergency Egress Window, Rev D-03,
Dec 2, 1985
22. VO70-553302, Rockwell Drawing, Window Installation -
Outer Emergency Egress, Rev A-05, Mar 12, 1983
23. VO70-553303, Rockwell Drawing, Window Installation,
CM, Emergency Egress, Rev C-07, Oct 12, 1984
24. VO70-562001, Rockwell Drawing, External Tank / Orbiter,
Forward Attach Installation, Rev C-18, Aug 20, 1985
25. V070-562003, Rockwell Drawing, Attach Assembly -
Forward, Orbiter ET Separation System, Rev D-02,
Oct 25, 1985
26. VO70-562033, Rockwell Drawing, Ball - Multipiece
Bearing, ET / Orbiter Forward Attach, Rev A-05,
Aug 27, 1985
27. VO70-562038, Rockwell Drawing, Bolt - Instrumented,
Orbiter / ET Forward Attach, Assembly of, Rev A-02,
May 27, 1986
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28. VO70-565000, Rockwell Drawing, Installation - ET
Umbilical Door Mechanism, Rev F-08, Jun 28, 1984
29.
30.
VO70-565212, Rockwell Drawing, Spring, Helical
Compression, Orbiter / ET Aft Attach Separation
System, Rev A-09, Oct 30, 1981
VO70-565217, Rockwell Drawing, Bolt, Frangible Nut,
Orbiter / ET Aft Attach Separation System, Rev A-09,
Jun 19, 1975
31.
32.
33.
34.
VO70-565330, Rockwell Drawing, Bracket Assembly -
Orbiter LO2 Electrical, Umbilical, ET / Orbiter
Separation System, Rev D-07, Oct 28, 1982
VO70-565371, Rockwell Drawing, Curtain Closeout, ET
Umbilical Plate, LH2, Assembly of, Rev C-02,
Jun 15, 1986
VO70-565381, Rockwell Drawing, Side Strut - Orbiter /
External Tank Umbilical Separation System, Assembly of,
Rev A-01, May 13, 1976
V070-565382, Rockwell Drawing, Side Strut Installation
- umbilical Separation System, External Tank, Rev
A-03, Jan 12, 1983
35. VO70-565396, Rockwell Drawing, Curtain CloseQut, ET
Umbilical Plate, LO2, Assembly of, Rev C-03,
Jun 13, 1986
36. VO70-585227, Rockwell Drawing, Clamp Set - Support,
Two Lines, Rev 7, Nov 7, 1975
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
VO72-555215, Rockwell Drawing, Pyrotechnic and Cover
Installation - Orbiter / External Tank, Aft Attach /
Separation System Rev D-03, Mar 3, 1987
VO72-555369, Rockwell Drawing, Wire Harness
Installation - ET / Orbiter, umbilical Hold Down /
Release, Rev E-01, Jan 23, 1983
VO72-565201, Rockwell Drawing, Fastener Installation -
Orbiter / External Tank, Aft Attach / Separation
System, Rev D-05, Feb 27, 1987
VO72-565249, Rockwell Drawing, Stopper - Orbiter /
External Tank, Aft Attach - Separation System, Rev
A-03, May 19, 1982
VO72-565370, Rockwell Drawing, Mechanical / Pyrotechnic
Installation - ET / Orbiter Umbilical Hold Down /
Release, Rev D-IO, Aug 7, 1986
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42. VO72-565450, Rockwell Drawing, Stud - Orbiter / ET
Umbilical Hold Down / Release, Assembly of, Rev A-05,
Aug 31, 1981
43. VS27-415267, Rockwell Drawing, Disconnect Assembly -
LH2, ET Half, Rev D-03, Mar 18, 1986
44. VS27-415273, Rockwell Drawing, Disconnect Assembly -
-LO2, ET Half, Rev D-02, Mar 20, 1986
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Amp
Ant
ATO
BFS
CB
CIL
Ckt
Cont'd
Cur
Depl
DC
EPD&C
Eq
ET
F
FMC
FMEA
FPC
Func
Fwd
Guill
Hdw
Herm
HW
Hz
IOA
Jett
LH2
Lim
LO2
APPENDIX A
ACRONYNS and ABBREVIATIONS
- Alternating Current
- Abort Once Around
- Ampere
- Antenna
- Abort To Orbit
- Backup Flight Software
- Circuit Breaker
- Critical Items List
- Circuit
- Continued
- Current
- Deploy
- Direct Current
- Electrical Power Distribution and Control
- Equipment
- External Tank
- Functional
- Forward Motor Controller
- Failure Mode Effects Analysis
- Forward Power Controller
- Functional
- Forward
- Guillotine
- Hardware
- Hermetically
- Hardware
- Hertz (cycles per second)
- Independent Orbiter Analysis
- Jettison
- Liquid Hydrogen
- Limiting
- Liquid Oxygen
A-I
MDAC
MDM
MLG
MPM
MRL
NA
NASA
NLG
NSI
NSTS
OA
OAO
ATO
OF
Orb
P
PASS
PBM
PCA
PCI
Ph
PIC
P/L
PLBD
Pos
Pyro
Rel
Retn
RMS
RPC
RR
RTLS
Sep
Sta
STS
Sys
TAL
VAC
VDC
l-Ph
3-Ph
ACRONYMS and ABBREVIATIONS (Cont'd)
- McDoDnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Main Landing Gear
- Manipulator Positioning Mechanixm
- Manipulatot Retention Mechanism
- Not applicable
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- Nose Landing Gear
- NASA Standard Initiator
- National Space Transportation System
- Operational Aft
- Once-Around-Abort
- Abort-to-Orbit
- Operational Forward
- Orbiter
- Pass
- Primary Avionics Systems Software
- Payload Bay Mechanical
- Power Controller Assembly
- Potential Critical Item
- Phase
- Pyro Initiator Controller
- Payload
- Paylaod Bay Door
- Position
- Pyrotechnic
- Release
- Retention
- Remote Manipulator System
- Remote Power Controller
- Rendezvous Radar
- Return-To-Launch-Site
- Separation
- Station
- Space Transportation System
- System
- Trans-Atlantic-Landing (Abort Landing)
- Volts Alternating Current
- Volts Direct Current
- Single Phase
- Three Phase
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
I
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, I0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
I
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight _ _ _
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCy CREw pROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest critical_ty
_GHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(OPS)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
- assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRI_.MAR¥ MISSION OBJECTIVES _ worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE _ begins at_transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and_ends at first maid landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main .gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions fo;
Preparation o_ FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions.
i
m
i.
•
•
•
.
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored duringAOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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B.3 Pyrotechnics-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly level
of the Pyrotechnic devices in the Orbiter Landing Systems,
Orbiter/ET Separation System, RMS Guillotine and Jettison System,
Rendezvous Radar Release System, and the Ground Emergency Egress
System. The analysis considered the worst case effects of the
hardware or functional failure on the subsystem, mission, and
crew and vehicle safety.
1. Component age life was not considered in the analysis.
RATIONALE: Component age analysis is beyond the scope
of this task.
• Criticality of emergency system failure modes were
established on the basis of the effect of the first
failure of the emergency system on the crew or vehicle•
RATIONALE: Regardless of the number of failures that
would have to occur before the emergency
system would be required, its purpose is
to accomplish its intended task without
fail under emergency conditions. Emergency
systems are not employed unlessthere is
an emergency condition in existence.
.
•
Criticality of backup system pyrotechnic failures were
established with the same approach as emergency systems.
RATIONALE: The backup pyrotechnics involved in this
analysis are employed only (albeit
automatically) after failure of the
primary system, as in the Landing
Gear deployment, therefore all previous
failures are discounted in the Criticality
assignments.
Premature of inadvertent operation of pyrotechnic
devices is considered to be the highest criticality.
RATIONALE: Uncommanded operation by a pyrotechnic
device would be catastrophic particularly
when involved in separation of Shuttle
elements and premature deployment of
landing gear. Premature operation of
emergency or backup pyrotechnics could
likewise cause unpredictable results.
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. Failure modes were limited to failure of the component
or assembly to function as intended and inadvertent
or premature uncommanded operation.
RATIONALE: Whether the cause of the failure of a
pyrotechnic device to function as intended
to accomplish an action be a failure to
fire, fire with insufficient force, or low
pressure output, the result would be
essentially the same. Failures of other
systems that cause inadvertent operation
of the pyrotechnic devices covered in this
analysis are not considered a failure of
the pyrotechnic device itself. If a
switch fails and causes a command to be
issued to fire a pyrotechnic device, the
failure lies with the switch.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ASSESSMENT
This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the Assessment of the Pyrotechnics Subsystem. The
information on these worksheets facilitates the comparison of
the NASA FMEA/CIL (Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed
analysis worksheets included in Appendix E. Each of these
worksheets identifies the NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding
MDAC Analysis Worksheet ID (Appendix E), hardware item,
Criticality, redundancy screens, and recommendations. For each
failure mode, the highest assessed hardware and functional
criticality is compared and discrepancies noted as "N" in the
compare row under the column where the discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R ....= Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F - Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
NASA Data :
Baseline
New
NASA FMEA/CIL
- Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row :
N = Non compare for that column (deviation)
C-1
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
J
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4601
NASA FMEA #: P2-1A-015-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
pYROTECHNICS
4601
THRUSTER ASSY
W. W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
COMPARE
REDUNDANCY SCREENSCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ i/I ] C ] [ ] [ ]
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
mi
m_
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NONE
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4602
NASA FMEA #: P2-1A-035-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4602
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NONE
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: PYRO-4603
NASA FMEA #: P2-1A-035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4603
PRESSURE CA/_TRIDGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
ix]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NONE
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4604
NASA _EA #: P2-1A-097-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4604
THRUSTER ASSY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
T,_.AD _ALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY _D_D_CY S_EENS
FLIGHT
HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMP_ [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECO_NDATIONS: (If differentfrom NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
.... (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL _TENTION _TIONA_: (If applicable)
.i.... ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE, IOA CONCURS WITH NASA POST 51L FMEA. UPGRADE IoA CRIT
TO I/i.
REPORT DATE 02/05/88 C-5
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4605
NASA FMEA #: P2-1A-103-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4605
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE, IOA CONCURS WITH NASA POST 51L FMEA. UPGRADE IOA CRIT
TO I/I.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4606
NASA FMEA #: P2-1A-103-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4606
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
T
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /1 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] CN] [N] [N] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CiL RETENTION RATIONALE" (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NONE
[ ]
[ ]
1
REPORT DATE 02/05/88 C-7
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4607
NASA FMEA #: P2-1A-104-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4607
THRUSTER ASSY
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
m
I
mm
mm
l
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NONE _ _
m
ms
ms
m
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R
mm
l
J
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4608
NASA FMEA #: P2-1A-107-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4608
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ i /i ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA FMEA. RECOMMEND DOWNGRADING
THE CRIT OF THIS FMEA TO 2/IR.
REPORT DATE 02/08/88 C-9
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4609
NASA FMEA #: P2-1A-107-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4609
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NONE
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
m
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mm
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m
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
PYRO-4651
02-3-F3-I
SUBSYSTEM: PYROTECHNICS
MDAC ID: 4651
ITEM: SHEAR BOLT
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
W. W. ROBINSON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NONE
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/05/88 C-II
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U
mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4652
NASA FMEA #: 02-3-F3-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: PYROTECHNICS
MDAC ID: 4652
ITEM: SHEAR BOLT
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /1 ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
mm
i
m
L
i
Im
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NONE
[ ]
[ ]
mm
m
mm
i
m
I
I
D
i
Z
l
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4653
NASA FMEA #: 02-3-FI-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4653
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ NA]
[N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. CORRECT IOA FMEA SCREEN C.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/05/88 C-13
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: PYRO-4654
NASA FMEA #: 02-3-FI-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4654
PRESSURECARTRIDGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NONE _
B
m
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m
im
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mm
mm
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m
mm
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n
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4655
NASA FMEA #: 02-3-A4-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4655
FRANGIBLE NUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NONE
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
m
m
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4656
NASA FMEA #: 02-3-A4-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4656
FRANGIBLE NUT
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NONE
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
I
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I
I
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i
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4657
NASA FMEA #: 02-3-A6-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4657
DETONATOR BOOSTER (2)
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS :
NO ISSUE. CORRECT IOA SCREEN C.
[ ]
[ ]
r_
u
_z
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4658
NASA FMEA #: 02-3-A6-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4658
DETONATOR BOOSTER (2)
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NONE
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
m
b
h
g
b
m
m
m
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[]
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m
B
u
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4661
NASA FMEA #: 02-3-U4-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: PYROTECHNICS
MDAC ID: 4661
ITEM: FRANGIBLE NUT
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NONE
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
u
w
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4662
NASA FMEA #: 02-3-U4-2
SUBSYSTEM: PYROTECHNICS
MDAC ID: 4662
ITEM: FRANGIBLE NUT
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW[ ]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
mm
M
i
m
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NONE
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4663
NASA FMEA #: 02-3-UI-I
SUBSYSTEM: PYROTECHNICS
MDAC ID: 4663
ITEM: DETONATOR
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /iR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. CORRECT IOA FMEA SCREEN C.
[ ]
[ ]
m
i
ram-
n
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l
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4664
NASA FMEA #: 02-3-UI-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: PYROTECHNICS
MDAC ID: 4664
ITEM: DETONATOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
I
n
B
w
m
U
R
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS-
NONE
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4701
NASA FMEA #: 02-4-RI03-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
PYROTECHNICS
4701
GUILLOTINE ASSY, PYROTECHNIC
W. W. ROBINSON
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NONE
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/05/88 C-23
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U
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4702
NASA FMEA #: 02-4-RI03-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4702
GUILLOTINE ASSY, PYROTECHNIC
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B C
[P]
[ NA]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
CX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
• (ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_Ks:
NONE
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
mm
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w
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4703
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
PYROTECHNICS
4703
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2)
W. W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 2 /IR ]
L
(If different from NASA)
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RECOMMEND THAT A NASA FMEA BE GENERATED FOR THIS FAILURE MODE FOR
THIS COMPONENT.
REPORT DATE 02/05/88 C-25
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: PYRO-4704
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM-.
LEAD ANALYST:
PYROTECHNICS
4704
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2)
W. W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RECOMMEND THAT A NASA FMEA BE GENERATED FOR THIS FAILURE MODE FOR
THIS COMPONENT. _!_÷_:!:..... :_ _:_ _ _' :_ _'_-_ .....
l
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4705
NASA FMEA #: 02-4-RI04-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4705
RELEASE NUT
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ i /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NONE
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4706
NASA FMEA #: 02-4-RI04-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4706
RELEASE NUT
NASA DATA: _ _z_:_:_
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] [N]
[X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ .....
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NONE
I
I
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w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: _4/S8
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4707
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4707
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2)
NASA DATA: :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] " _ [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/IR] [ ] [ ] [ ] [X]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RECOMMEND THAT A NASA FMEA BE GENERATED FOR THIS FAILURE MODE FOR
THIS COMPONENT.
m
m
u_
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4708
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4708
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[1/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS'.
RECOMMEND THAT A NASA FMEA BE GENERATED FOR THIS FAILURE MODE FOR
THIS _OMI_3NENT ........
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u
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4751
NASA FMEA #: 02-5-J01-i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
°
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
PYROTECHNICS
4751
RETRACTOR - MANIPULATOR ARM RELEASE
W. W. ROBINSON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NONE
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w
i
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: PYRO-4752
NASA FMEA #: 02-5-J01-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4752
RETRACTOR- MANIPULATORARM RELEASE
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
ix]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
I
m
m
mm
i
I
mm
J
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NONE
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4753
NASA FMEA #: 02-5-J02-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
PYROTECHNICS
4753
GUILLOTINE ASSY PYRO
W. W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NONE
[ ]
[ ]
m
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4754
NASA FMEA #: 02-5-J02-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4754
GUILLOTINE ASSY PYRO
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
R
D
m
mm
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NONE
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4755
NASA FMEA #: 02-5-J04-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4755
GUILLOTINE ASSY
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
NONE
w
m
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET g
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4756
NASA FMEA #: 02-5-J04-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4756
GUILLOTINE ASSY
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if appiicable) _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NONE
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
H DW/FUN C
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
PYRO-4801
07-48051-1
PYROTECHNICS
4801
OUTER WINDOW ASSY
W. W. ROBINSON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
..... (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NONE
C ]
C ]
L_
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET mmm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
PYRO-4802
07-48052-1
PYROTECHNICS
4802
OUTER WINDOW ASSY
W. W. ROBINSON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
B C
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
_ ITEM
[X] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NONE
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4803
NASA FMEA #: 07-48053-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
PYROTECHNICS .......
4803
ENERGY TRANSFER SYSTEM
W. W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ P )
[ NA] [ NA] ..... [ NA]
[ x] *
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [N] [N] [N] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ) [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. CORRECT IOA SCREENS.
[ ]
[ ]
L
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m
m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4804
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
07-48054-1
PYROTECHNICS
4804
INITIATOR ASSY PYRO
W. W. ROBINSON
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. CORRECT IOA SCREENS.
[ ]
[ ]
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i.d
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i
ASSESSMENTDARE" 22 4/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4805
NASA FMEA #: 07-48055-1
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: PYROTECHNICS ...............
MDAC ID: 4805
ITEM: 0.3-SEC TIME DELAY CARTRIDGE ASSY
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
romp
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. CORRECT IOA SCREENS.
[ ]
[ ]
w
w
w
W
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4806
NASA FMEA #: 07-48056-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS ..............
4806
THRU BULKHEAD INITIATOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. CORRECT IOA SCREENS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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CRITICAL ITEMS
._ _i _i¸
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NASA FMEA IOA ID
P2-1A-015-2 4601
P2-1A-035-1 4602
P2-1A-035-2 4603
P2-1A-097-1 4604
P2-1A-103-1 4605
P2-1A-103-2 4606
P2-1A-104-1 4607
P2-1A-107-1 4608
P2-1A-107-2 4609
02-3-F3-I 4651
02-3-F3-2 4652
02-3-FI-I 4653
02-3-FI-2 4654
02-3-A4-I 4655
02-3-A4-2 4656
02-3-A6-I 4657
02-3-A6-2 4658
02-3-U4-I 4661
02-3-U4-2 4662
02-3-UI-I 4663
02-3-UI-2 4664
02-4-RI03-I 4701
02-4-RI03-2 4702
NONE 4703
NONE 4704
02-4-RI04-I 4705
02-4-RI04-2 4706
NONE 4707
NONE 4708
02-5-J01-i 4751
02-5-J01-2 4752
02-5-J02-i 4753
02-5-J02-2 4754
02-5-J04-I 4755
02-5-J04-2 4756
07-48051-1 4801
07-48052-1 4802
07-48053-1 4803
07-48054-1 4804
07-48055-1 4805
07-48056-1 4806
APPENDIX D
CRITICAL ITEMS
ITEM
THRUSTER ASSY
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
THRUSTER ASSY
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
THRUSTER ASSY
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
SHEAR BOLT
SHEAR BOLT
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
FRANGIBLE NUT
FRANGIBLE NUT
DETONATOR BOOSTER (2)
DETONATOR BOOSTER (2)
FRANGIBLE NUT
FRANGIBLE NUT
DETONATOR
DETONATOR
GUILLOTINE ASSY, PYRO
GUILLOTINE ASSY, PYRO
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2 )
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2)
RELEASE NUT
RELEASE NUT
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2)
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2)
RETRACTOR - MANIP ARM
RETRACTOR - MANIP ARM
GUILLOTINE ASSY PYRO
GUILLOTINE ASSY PYRO
GUILLOTINE ASSY
GUILLOTINE ASSY
OUTER WINDOW ASSY
OUTER WINDOW ASSY
ENERGY TRANSFER SYSTEM
INITIATOR ASSY PYRO
0.3-SEC TIME DEL CART
THRU BULKHEAD INIT
FAILURE MODE
FAILS TO OPERATE
FAILS TO OPERATE
INADVERTENT OPERATION
FAILS TO OPERATE
FAILS TO OPERATE
FIRES INADVERTENTLY
FAIL TO OPERATE
FAIL TO OPERATE
FIRES INADVERTENTLY
PREMATURE FRACTURE
FAIL TO FRACTIq_E
FAIL TO FUNCTION
INADVERTENT OPERATION
PREMATURE FRACTURE
FAIL TO FRACTURE
FAILS TO FIRE
INADVERTENT OPERATION
FAIL TO FRACTURE
PREMATURE FRACTURE
FAIL TO FIRE
INADVERTENT OPERATION
FAIL TO FUNCTION
INADVERTENT OPERATION
FAIL TO FUNCTION
INADVERTENT OPERATION
FAIL TO FUNCTION
INADVERTENT OPERATION
FAIL TO FUNCTION
INADVERTENT OPERATION
FAILS TO FUNCTION
INAD_RTENT OPERATION
FAILS TO FUNCTION
INADVERTENT OPERATION
FAILS TO FUNCTION
INADVERTENT OPERATION
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO OPEN
REDUCED OR NO OUTPUT
NO OUTPUT
NO OUTPUT, X-S DELAY
NO OUTPUT
I
J
l
I
n
II
III
m
II
IIB
iim
I
fen
II
II
IJ
=
I
im
D-2
II
zAPPENDIX E
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA85001-
01, Analysis of the Pyrotechnics Subsystem FMEA/CIL (01 January
1988). Prior results were obtained independently and documented
before starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental
analysis was performed to address failure modes not previously
considered by the IOA. EaCh sheet identifies the hardware item
being analyzed, parent assembly and function performed. For each
failure mode possiblecauses are identified, and hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as
described in N$TS 22206, _structions for Preparation of FMEA and
CIL, i0 October 1986. Failure mode effects are described at the
bottom of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at
the top.
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LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 _ Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 _ Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
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APPENDIX F
!_ASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment
Number, NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, and IOA
recommendations.
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Appendix F Legend
¢Qde Definition
1 IOA recommends Upgrading the FMEA Crit
from 2/IR to I/i.
2. IOA recommends that a NASA FMEA be generated for this
failure mode for this component.
3. IOA recommends correcting the screens on this IOA FMEA.
4. IOA recommends Downgrading the FMEA Crit
from I/i to 2/IR.
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NASA FNEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOHHENDATIONS
I
I
..... .......t..... ..... _°...°..*...o*..e.m. ...... ° ...................... ÷ ................
.... . ................ .. ............. ÷ ......
NASA [OA CelT
FNEA NUNBER ASSESSNENT NO. HW/F
[DENTI Flees 1 NASA I ]OA
I I
........... 4. ...... 4. ..........
I
SCREENS CRIT I SCREENS
HW/F l
A B C I A B C
.......... . ........... .....°....... ......... ... .............. .i...........
P2-1A-015-2
P2-1A-035-1
P2-1A-035-2
P2-1A-097-1
P2-1A-103-1
P2-1A-103-2
PZ-1A-104-1
P2-1A-107-1
P2-1A-107-2
02-3-F3-1
02-3-F3-2
02-3-F1-1
PYRO-4601
PYRO-4602
PYRO-4603
PYRO-6604
PYRO-6605
PYRO-6606
PYRO-4607
PYRO-6608
PYRO-6609
PYRO-4651
PYRO-4652
PYRO-465]
111
I/I
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
111
111
111
111
2/1R NA NA P
111
111
1/1
2/1R
2/1R
1/1
111
111
111
111
1/1
2/1R
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA MA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
RECOHHEND J
........ 4- ....... +
BIBI I
RES 1 I _
CODES J ISSUE I
1 I-"
........ 4. ....... 4.
.i
.i
am
ell
,,,i
.i
=
g
F-2 J
b
c .
u
m
¢_.;
........................................................................ ÷ ................
I I I
I IDENTIFIERS I NASA I IOA RECOMMEND
I I I
÷ ................. ÷ ................. ÷ ...... ÷ .......... ÷ ...... ÷ .................. ÷ .......
I I
NASA ZOA I CRIT I SCREENS
FREA NUHBER ASSESSMENT NO. I HU/F I
I I A a c
................................. ...÷ ...... ÷ ...........
02-3-F1-2
02-3-A4-1
02-3-A4-2
02-3-A6- 1
02-3-A6-2
PYRO-4654
PYRO-4655
PYRO-4656
PYRO-4657
PYRO-4658
02-3-U4-I I PYRO-4661
I
I
02-3-U4-2 I. PYRO-4662
02-3-U1-1
02-3-U1-2
02-4-R103-1
02-4-R103-2
Xl
X2
02-4-R104-1
02-4-R104-2
PYRO-4663
PYRO-4664
PYRO-4701
PYRO-4702
PYRO-4703
PYRO-4704
PYRO-4705
PYRO-4706
I/I
1/1
111
2/IR
1/1
1/1
111
2/1R
1/1
111
212
1/1
1/1
I
CRIT J SCREENS RES
XW/F J CODES ISSUE
J A B C
...... ÷ ..........................
111
111
111
NA NAP 2/1R
1/1
I 1/1
1
1/1
MANA P 2/IR
1/1
F P P I/1
P F P 2/2
2/1R
2/2
P F P 1/1
P F P 1/1
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
3
3
2 X
2 X
F-3
_J
,mira
m.... . ......... °°... ..... . ...............................................
i
IDENTIFIERS NASA IOA RECOMMEND J
I
,.....° ................ .... ............... ÷ ................................... ÷ ....... ÷
I 1 I_
NASA IOA CRIT I SCREENS CRIT SCREENS RES ] I
FNEA NUMBER ASSESSMENT NO. HW/F J HN/F CODES 1 ISSUE I
IABC ABC 1 I
.......................................... ÷ ................................... ÷ ....... ÷
X3
X4
02-5-J01-1
02-5-J01-2
02-5-J02-1
02-5-J02-2
02-5-,_04- 1
o2-5-ao4-2
07-48051-1
07-48052-1
07-48053-1
07-48054-1
07-48055-1
PYRO-4707
PYRO-6708
PYRO-6751
PYRO-6752
PYRO-4753
PYRO-4754
PYRO-4755
PYRO-4756
PYRO-4801
PYRO-4802
PYRO-4803
PYRO-4804
PYRO-4805
PYRO-4806
1/1
1/1
1/1
111
I/I
2/2
111
1/1
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
211R
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
MA NA NA
F F P
F F P
F F P
F F P
211R
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
212
1/1
I/I
211R
211R
2/1R
2/1R
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA HA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA HA
NA NA NA
HA NA HA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA07-48056-1
..... ...°° ......... ........ .......! ................ | ...... | .......... | ....... i .......
J
.a
i
.,,m
L
Jm
tomb
mm
J
Z
i
BE
F-4
m
mm
